International Conference
Ukraine, Poland And The EU-Enlargement To The East

L’viv - Przemysl May 22-25, 2001

CEPS Commentary:

Borderland Europe: Galicia, Schengen and quid Ukraine?

Michael Emerson, 31 May, 2001

A remarkable thing happened on 23 May 2001 in the city of Przemysl, and Eastern Poland region bordering on the Western Ukrainian region of Galicia, whose capital city is Lviv. The Mayor of Przemysl was welcoming a conference of the Heinrich Boell Foundation of Berlin, which brought together a number of Polish, Ukrainian, French, German and other EU individuals (of which I was glad to be one) to study the implications of EU enlargement for this border region. As if timed perfectly for the conference, the Mayor was able to read out the text of an article by Goran Persson and Romano Prodi, published the day before in the International Herald Tribune, proposing that priority be given to relations between the enlarging European Union and Ukraine. In particular the two presidents of the EU institutions were proposing that the future EU member states neighbouring Ukraine (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania) join together with the EU in cooperative initiatives with Ukraine. The initiative was immediately welcomed by the regional authorities and members of the business and civil society institutions of Przemysl, and the unofficial representatives of Galicia (their regional leadership was not available for comment).

The region, and Galacia in particular, has been one of the classic victims of the European 20th century, and the works of the great powers of those times. At the beginning of the 20th century Galicia was part of the Austro-Hungarian empire. After the first World War Galicia became part of Poland. After the second World War Galicia became part of the Soviet Union, and the border regions became victims of an appalling, tragic, ethnic cleansing of Polish and Ukrainian populations from each others' territories, following extermination of the substantial Jewish populations of our regions under Hitler. Then in 1991 Galicia found itself a region of the newly independent Ukraine. Today the two regions of Przemysl and Galicia, and the two nations of Poland and Ukraine, are at peace with each other. In spite of heavy burdens of history they have achieved a reconciliation in the same category as the reconciliation of France and Germany and their Rhineland border regions such as Alsace-Lorraine. And now Poland is close to becoming a member state of the European Union. But the cruelty of history is not forgotten. There are worries about a new Berlin Wall being built between the two regions and nations, for which the mechanism could be a harsh, unthinking application of the EU's Schengen border regime. Such is the apprehension. Is it justified?

Today’s frontiers between Poland and Ukraine are bad enough, years before Schengen will be applied at this frontier, that it is still premature to say the least to complain about Schengen. For example, sleepy little Lviv airport took two hours to pass one small plane load of passengers through passport control, with no other flight arrival or departure in sight. The passport control procedures were a museum piece of bureaucratic complication and congestion.

Moving on to the land frontier, this too was a memorable experience. Moving into Poland, our bus-load of international visitors only took another two hours to cross the frontier, and it was hard to say whether the Ukrainian or Polish services were slower. But our experience was a mere trifle. Alongside us in the regular queue for local traffic were about 200 cars, and their movement seemed imperceptible compared to our fast track. It must have been six hours or more for the locals. It was said by some that each car had to be searched thoroughly for contraband, and by others that the negotiation or bribes was the explanation. We made the return trip from Poland to Ukraine by another crossing point. This was given the build-up of a show-case, modern, high capacity crossing point. Indeed the infrastructure was impressive. The approach road was a fine new highway, financed by the European Union according to the publicity. The border post itself was a huge new installation, on the scale of a large motorway toll station, able to take many lanes of traffic at the same time. That is the good news. Indeed the queues of the dozen or so lanes were short compared to what we had seen in the morning. But then the bad news is that we spent an equally long time waiting for our passports and customs inspections to be cleared, for reasons which we were not able to understand. Much of the local traffic is banal, small-scale trade and contraband, for example just a few cartons of cigarettes and bottles of vodka. Pedestrians can pass the frontier faster, carrying the minimum allowable duty-free quantities, and arrange cars or buses on either side of the frontier to take them to the nearest market town. Such trips can be done every day, or even several times a day. Like that, poor unemployed citizens of Galicia can earn a survival income.

Today’s comparisons between the two border regions are cruel for Galicia. Lviv city was a Northern outpost of the former Austro-Hungarian empire, rich in architecture of style. Today the city and region are the most Westerly outpost of the former Soviet Union, unable to join with the Polish Western regions in their upsurge of evident modernization and renewal. The practicalities of life in Lviv include a serious water supply crisis, with only three hours of supply per day, and apparently also electricity supply problems with only patchy street lighting by night.

Of course Ukraine’s political crisis weighs also on the whole of the country. Ukraine has chosen to retain the centralized state model for its post-communist state-building transition. The centralised governance of Ukraine is in bad shape, as everyone knows. But this also means that the scope for regional initiative is stifled, whereas Galicia’s proximity to the West and its history and traditions might have enabled it to work out a regional formula for faster progress. A federal model for Ukraine might have helped, but is dismissed as an option that would undermine the nation’s first priority of nation-state building.

Still the European Union needs to work harder on devising a border-friendly Schengen regime. This question has not received much political or administrative priority so far. The emphasis in the EU has been on building up this remarkable new internal dimension to European integration - for justice and home affairs. The external implications of these home affairs are only beginning to surface, as the process of eastern EU enlargement advances. The competitive nature of the enlargement process discourages the candidate states from raising questions about how Schengen might need to be adapted to minimize adverse impacts on the future Eastern border regions. The priority for the accession candidates is to close as many negotiation chapters as fast as possible, and to avoid asking for special transitional arrangements, or even less derogations, except in cases of supreme political importance.

It is therefore desirable in principle that the EU itself should adopt a pro-active position in analyzing the problems in advance and proposing with the candidate states solutions. To leave it to the candidate states themselves imposes a moral hazard on them – either they ignore the interests of their Eastern neighbours, or they damage their negotiating position over accession. Faced with this hazard there is no doubt what they choose. Hence the notable silence from Poland and other candidate states over how to address the concerns of their Eastern neighbours.

Some ideas emerge among people who gather to analyse the problems and search for solutions, especially having in mind the Persson-Prodi political initiative for Ukraine.

(1) Multi-entry visas. Estonia and Russia have already agreed on a scheme for long-term multi-entry visas, issued free of charge, for citizens of their frontier region of Narva-Ivangorod. Poland and Ukraine could prepare a similar scheme for their border regions and that the EU could indeed encourage both parties to do so.

(2) EU consular services in the border region. The EU and its candidate states should start planning now for an adequate set of consulates in these border regions, such that visa requests to visit all Schengen states can be handled by one or more consulates of EU member states in regional centers such as Lviv.

(3) Customs and passport control delays. As reported, there are serious problems at the frontier already now before Polish accession to the EU and Schengen. The delays are inexcusable. The responsibility lies with Polish and Ukrainian authorities. There could be temporary deployment of EU customs personnel to assist and monitor corrective measures.

(4) Visa regime for EU visitors to Ukraine. The Ukrainian authorities should abolish visas for EU visitors, which is an unnecessary hindrance to tourism and business. If the state feels it cannot lose the revenue, then let the visa be bought at the point of entry with a simple quick formality (like Turkey does). This unilateral measure would be not unfair for Ukraine, since the EU would be making major efforts to help its border region in other ways.

(5) Electronic frontiers. Technical progress makes it possible to plan now for the considerable easing of frontier formalities, for example with machine-readable passports and visas. Also EU frontier posts, on-line electronically with the Schengen Information System, could be empowered to renew visas on the spot. The EU should consider introduction of a system of 'smart cards' (like a credit card, with photograph for identification) to control and record very short term visits (as introduced on the US-Mexican frontier for daily commuters across the frontier).

(6) Euro-region status. The Persson-Prodi proposals could imply application of the ‘Euro-region’ concept to the regions bordering Ukraine and its neighbouring future EU member states (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania). It is up to transfrontier regions themselves to decide whether to form a Euro-region. Such Euro-regions may also be eligible for EU financing from INTERREG of the Structural Funds, PHARE and TACIS. However the administrative borders between these different EU instruments make life very difficult if not impossible for integrated projects to be put together for EU financing. There has been sufficient experience of these problems, and now build up of the recognised political importance of the enlarging EU’s borderland regions, that the EU institutions should find the appropriate administrative solutions (such as separate budget lines for these overlapping regions). With the political will expressed in the Persson-Prodi initiative, these measures should be possible.

Ukraine's perspective of EU membership. There can be no illusions about the much bigger question of EU membership for Ukraine. It could not a practical matter for many years. However it is still a vital question for the formation of public attitudes and the strategies of enterprises, government and individuals of Ukraine to know where the country’s future lies. The EU could acknowledge and welcome Ukraine's perspective of ultimate membership. This is not a politically premature or operationally superfluous proposition. It concerns the direction of Ukraine’s geo-political future today. Many in the EU will comment that experience with Turkey’s long-range candidature is not encouraging for another very long-term commitment. But the cases are quite different. Ukraine today hesitates between Western (EU) and Eastern (Russian) orientations, at a time when Russia’s policy is openly aiming at re-consolidation of the former Soviet Union wherever possible, not excluding quasi-coercive tactics where this seems worth trying (viz. Georgia). The EU and Russia seek to establish themselves an increasingly substantial strategic partnership, which is fine. But if Ukraine wants for its part to set its sights long-term on integration with the EU, that should be encouraged in ways that are meaningful for the population, not just diplomatic/bureaucratic language like ‘exploiting the full potential of the partnership and cooperation agreement’. The perspective of EU membership, even only long-term, means something.