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   www.ji-magazine.lviv.ua
 

This is Ukraine today. C'est l'Ukraine d'aujourd'hui.

Dies ist die Ukraine heute. To jest Ukraina dzisiaj.

Esta es la actual Ucrania. Questo è l'Ucraina di oggi.

Esta é hoje a Ucrânia. Ukrajina je danas.

.

01.05.2014

 

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U.S., UK, Canada, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa

Maidan Community Sector, Lviv: Dear friends!

By annexing Crimea, Russia has carried out an act of aggression against Ukraine. Currently Russia is transferring terrorist and sabotage groups to Eastern Ukraine. Russia aims to prevent legitimate presidential elections from happening. Everyday life in Eastern Ukraine has turned into a continuous nightmare in the middle of Europe. Our country is being destroyed right before our eyes. We therefore take the courage to inform you about current events in Ukraine. This is just another point of view. We will do our best to remain objective.

 

May 1  The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a two-year Stand-By Arrangement for Ukraine. The arrangement amounts to US$17.01 billion.

May 1 An antiwar rally in support of Ukraine was held in St.Petersburg. Activists sang the anthem of Ukraine and walked along holding Ukrainian lags. An official pro-Putin rally took place in Moscow, approving the actions of pro-Russian separatists. Moscow riot police officers arrested eight activists who were walking and holding Ukrainian flag at Tverskaya Street.

May 1 The leader of pro-Russian union Velikaya Rus Yuriy Apukhtin who was detained with other extremists by Security Service of Ukraine (SSU), had planned explosions for May 9 (during commemorative Victory Day events), states SSU.

May 1 In Donetsk, the pro-Russian separatists seized the Prosecutor's Office building. While hiding behind civilians, separatists used firearms against the soldiers of National Guard of Ukraine. On Tuesday, during the attack on the Prosecutor's Office 26 people were injured, two of them have been hospitalized.

May 1 Acting President of Ukraine Oleksandr Turchynov has signed a decree on conscription for military service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military formations of Ukraine.

May 1 Russian President Vladimir Putin believes that the Ukrainian government should withdraw its troops from the troubled regions in the eastern part of the country where pro-Russian separatists are currently committing acts of violence. Putin has said this during a telephone conversation with German Chancellor Angela Merkel.


P.S.: Please spread this appeal as much as possible.


Andrew A. Michta

Crisis in Ukraine

Known Unknowns

A fog of uncertainty has descended on Ukraine and Eastern Europe, but there are still a few things that we do know (as well as a few things that we know we dont know).

The crisis in Ukraine has been building up not for months, as media accounts have it, but for years, especially if we recognize the original framing of Vladimir Putins Munich 2007 declaration of intent to reverse the damage to Russias power caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union. So it is not premature to draw some preliminary conclusions as to how arguably the greatest crisis along Europes periphery since the end of the Cold War has shaped the Transatlantic security environment. Today Ukraine and all of Eastern Europe are covered by a blanket of uncertainty. But we can nevertheless discern the basic shapes of several unknowns beneath that blanket.

There is no question that the principal culprit in the unfolding crisis is Vladimir Putins Russia, and specifically its neo-imperial project. A lot of ink, too, has been spilled over Ukrainians complicity and culpability for what has befallen them from the east. But we also need to ask ourselves what role the strategic drought in Washington in relations with Europe has played in the current predicament. In particular, the Obama Administrations conviction that Eastern Europe was a done deal, and that America needed to pivot unequivocally toward the Pacific and leave the perennially self-focused Europeans to take care of their own needs, has set the tone for Transatlantic relations, especially at the military level. While Americas expectations that Europe should spend more on defense are more than justified, those expectations cannot be met if they are seen as merely transactional in nature and not part of a larger strategic framework.

Of course, Europe is also guilty of the sins of omission and commission that contributed to the drama unfolding on the continents periphery. For in its own way the traditional inertia and indecision of the European Union has played a key part. It is true that the Eastern Partnership led by Poland and Sweden offered a smidgen of hope to the pro-Western forces in Eastern Europe that they would not be left on the other side of the divide. But for the largest European powers, on the other hand, especially Germany, these prospects always belonged in the stratospheric layers of high theory. Add to this the EU bureaucracys traditional penchant for keeping things open (i.e., indecision), which pumped out conflicting messages to the region, contributing both to a sense of opportunity and to unease in Moscow. In the end, when Ukrainians in Maidan simply said no to their gangster government, the European Unions efforts to have its cake in Ukraine and eat it too came to bite us all.

We already know the obvious: Today Ukraine is the core geopolitical argument, not only between Russia and the West but also within the Transatlantic alliance. Its outcome will define how Russia relates to the West, especially to the United States, in the coming decade, on multiple levels, from the most basic economic relations to military competition. We can also glean today the general outline of the strategic objectives in Eastern Europe for both Russia and the West, with a clear indication of the mismatch between what the two sides are trying to accomplish.

Russian propaganda notwithstanding, the European Unions goal has never been to actually bring Ukraine into the fold as a full-fledged EU member down the line, and it is questionable whether it wanted to build a sustainable interim framework for associationthe subsequent declarations and agreements are derivatives from the crisis, not initial strategic assumptions. At the same time, today Russia cannot bring Ukraine immediately into the Eurasian Union, for whatever imperial aspirations Vladimir Putin has, he understands the complexity of that countrys ethnic makeup. Having exploited it better than most, he cannot be under any illusions that Ukraine today would be ready to make such a decision forthwith. The reality is different: Putins goal for now is largely negativethat is, to ensure that Ukraine will never join either the European Union or NATO, leaving the pathway for his integrative project open for the future. Likewise, the United States and the European Union are more interested in foreclosing Ukraines full integration in the Russia sphere of influence than they are in peeling it away from Russia. Before the Maidan explosion last year, a possible solution to this dilemma could have been de facto or de jure neutrality for Ukraine, with the country still eventually drifting into Russias orbit. However, events on the ground have outpaced contingency planning. Whats more, such a resolution today is largely impossible not because the West would ultimately reject it, but because the Ukrainian public would veto it even more forcefully than Yanukovychs initial deal.

Today what divides the United States and Europeor rather individual European capitals, for a consensus is simply not thereare the ends-in-view of our respective approaches: how much to give in to Moscows demands, and at what price. The added variable is the constant of Russias expectations, growing with each passing day, for since NATO has ruled out any military response, Ukraine is Putins crisis to escalate or de-escalate at will. In statement after statement, Moscow has made it abundantly clear that it will no longer accept a non-aligned Ukraine. It has come to see the country as a buffer state, one whose further partition seems all but inevitable. Russia demands the right not only to hold on to parts of Ukraines territory, but also, more dangerously, to determine the constitutional framework of its neighboring state.

We know already that Russia sees Ukraine as a landmark event, the beginning of its return to superpower status in world politics. Still, the notion that Russia has the power potential comparable to what is represented by the collective West, or even China, seems more like wishful thinking. And yet Russias calculus in its confrontation with the West, especially the United States, is largely based on military indices of power, especially the strategic nuclear component and Russias conventional military forces relative to the region. Time and again Moscow has demonstrated its ability to equalize the power disparity through its continued nuclear parity with the United States, coupled with the sheer determination to act, including the willingness to use military forcesomething the West has ruled out.

Next, the crisis in Ukraine should disabuse anyone still pining for the reset of the notion that Moscow will accept the model of cooperation with the United States proposed at the beginning of the Obama Administration, notwithstanding Washingtons concessions at the time and since, including the scrapping of the Bush-era missile defense program in Central Europe. It is clear that the dominant narrative in Russia today about the historical meaning of the fall of the Berlin Wall is very much like Germanys Dolchstosslegende between the two world wars. The conviction is especially pronounced among the Russian military and intelligence services that the Soviet Union was never defeated but simply surrendered without a shot under treacherous leadership. President Putins $700 billion military modernization program for the next decade is intended to restore the Russian military to its former greatness, in the process putting to rest the image of Russia as the land of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, caught in periodic times of trouble (smutnoye vremya).

Another known is that, notwithstanding the numerous columnists declaring that Ukraine has forced the West to confront the reality of Russias revisionism, the crisis has caused divisions within the West that are deeper today than at any point in recent memory. Western reactions continue to run behind the curve of Russias initiatives, whether on the ground in Ukraine or in various multinational fora, most recently during the framing of the so-called Geneva compromise which proved to be little more than a tactical move by Moscow to test Western cohesion before accelerating its Spetsnaz campaign in Donetsk. Thus far it appears that such tactics to preserve the current state of disarray among Western allies have vindicated Putins strategy of leveraging the United States determination to deescalate the crisis, and EU leaders determination to preserve its economic ties with Russia, ensuring that any Western-supported military response by Ukraine to Russian aggression is off the table.

We also know that in the wake of the crisis, U.S. re-engagement in Europe is all but inevitable, but there is no consensus yet as to its form and scope. The Obama Administrations Ukraine policy has been driven by an overarching desire to minimize the costs of re-Europeanizing U.S. security policy priorities. Although today in Washington only the most Pollyannaish would still believe that a pivot to Asia could be predicated on an implicit pivot away from Europe, budget realities remain what they have been, regardless of whether Mr. Putin stays at home or marches on. If there is a bit of good news for the collective West in the unfolding drama along Europes periphery, it is that, whether one likes it or not, the United States is back in European security affairs; the outstanding question is the depth of its renewed commitment.

The most important known is that Europes key power will not support direct military assistance to Ukraine. Germany sent a clear message early in the crisis that it would oppose any effort to militarize the conflict, notwithstanding the fact that Ukraine has been the target of Russian military operations. The ongoing Western discord on economic sanctions against Russia, both within Europe and across the Atlantic, is proof positive that, several months into the crisis, Putin can still count on having a disunited and reluctant adversary. Here Germany remains the key variable; specifically, Berlins unwillingness thus far to redefine its Ostpolitik and abandon its allegedly modernizing engagement with Russia. In fairness, German economic interests remain too deeply embedded there to allow rapid movement in the opposite direction, and not just in the energy sector. Hence, lobbying from the German business community against Russian sanctions and statements from Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier warning of military escalation and in opposition to NATO ground troops presence in Poland are but the tip of the iceberg in a deepening clinch on Russia policy that has emerged in the European Union in the wake of the crisis. To be fair, although Germany remains the driver of EU foreign policy, similar sentiments prevail in the business communities of other major powers in Western Europe, especially in the United Kingdom, Italy, and, to a lesser extent, France.

NATO is another known unknown in this crisis. NATO is divided when it comes to its relations with Russia in a different way than the European Union, for in contrast to Western Europe, the north-central European and the Baltic members will always prioritize their security over their considerable economic interests in Russia. In practical terms this means that, unless the Obama Administration can articulate a proactive strategy towards Russia and generate sufficient support among West European allies around such a policy, it must largely deal with Moscow through bilateral initiatives. Because of the security imperative dominant along NATOs northeastern flank, one aspect of the Transatlantic relationship that is functioning effectively now is Americas relationship with the states in the region, whose acute and justified sense of danger has translated into a series of efforts to bring U.S. military assets there. But even absent such a U.S.-led strategy for Eurasia, actions by key European alliesin particular Germanyhave served as brakes on the pace of U.S. military deployments in the region, especially since the Obama Administration has yet to show much enthusiasm for such actions in the first place. Nonetheless, the United States has stepped up to reassure the northeastern flank states, in stark comparison to Western Europes inaction (save for four British Typhoons and four French Rafale jets dispatched to Lithuania and Poland, respectively, for Baltic duty). Although current U.S. deployments in Poland and the Baltics have been limited, they are nonetheless absolutely criticalespecially the ground forcesfor sending a message that the United States takes its Article V obligations seriously.

This brings up a key unknown unknown: How will the United States ultimately define its presence in north-central Europe? One response to the drift in Western Europe would be for the United States to invest in those countries in NATO that have shown themselves willing and able to work across the Atlantic and to cooperate regionally to confront the rising Russian threat. Here Scandinavia, the so-called Visegrad 4 led by Poland, the Baltics, and possibly Romania could constitute the core foundation of such a reorientation. But a move to regionalize NATOs response, if it were to leave out Western Europe over time, runs too high a risk of undercutting allied solidarity. Such an approach would also inevitably run counter to intra-EU pressure, making economic linkages by new NATO members to those of the old core all but impossible to overcome, especially during continued budgetary austerity. Hence, 

Washington should make its best effort to follow two tracks: expand U.S. military deployments in Poland and the Baltics, and also lead all NATO members to develop a strategy for the northeastern flank. For while it should work by building consensus around the new strategy and leading by example, the United States should also firmly demand that the time has come for the Transatlantic alliance to speak with one voice on Russia. Russias challenge is to NATO as a whole, and the alliance needs to respond collectively.

But we know that Europes paralysis means that, on the Western side, the crisis is now firmly in the hands of the Obama Administration. It might (and in fact lets hope it does) grate on EU sensibilities that, yet again, it has only a limited ability to shape its security environment so close to home. But even so, there should be no illusions after the fiasco of the so-called Geneva deal, that in the near term anything viable will be negotiated by John Kerry and Sergei Lavrovin part because that is how Russia wants it.

The key is this: We know today that the West will not militarily assist post-Soviet countries outside NATO threatened by Russias neo-imperial ambition. It is also clear that containment is the best option we can hope for, though in a number of Western states large portions of the public believe that Ukraine is a regional crisis and not part of Europes (and by extension Americas) vital national interests. Some commentators in the United States and Europe have gone so far as to claim that the West in effect has itself to blame for enlarging NATO to the east, in the process breaking its alleged promises to Mikhail Gorbachev. The fact that such arguments are even madethat is, that post-communist Europe would have been better off as a macro-Ukraine of sorts or a grey zone where a new Russian sphere of influence would be established by defaultsays a lot about what passes for realism in some Western policy debates.

We already know that a new fault line running along the borders of the Baltics and the Bug River is now an undeniable reality, which, at least until Russia moves again to expand its sphere of privileged interest farther, is a baseline that will shape the NATO-Russia relationship. It therefore matters a great deal for the future of NATO whether the alliance will devise a new strategy and build contingency planning that can then be discussed and approved by the upcoming UK summit. Every decision taken between now and September, especially the critical ones concerning the deployment of U.S. and NATO troops in Poland and the Baltic States, will impact the direction of the unfolding drama in Eastern Europe. These decisions will also shape Russias choices going forward, potentially deterring it from moving into Moldova, Georgia, or Kazakhstan.

The largest unknown is the lessons the Obama Administration will draw from this confrontation. To put it differently, it is about the extent to which Russia has linked and will continue to link other agenda items to its relationship with the United States: Iran, Afghanistan, Syria, nuclear arms control are but the most prominent among them. Thus far it seems after three months of spurious negotiations that Washington is not going to prioritize Eastern Europe over those agenda items, and that Putins linkage has held. The question is not whether the United States will honor its treaty obligation. That message has been unequivocal: It will. What is unknown at this point, however, is whether the Administration will continue to operate on the narrowly defined premise that its actions ought to be driven by its treaty obligations to other NATO members alone, rather than those core commitments serving as a baseline for a proactive strategy aimed at stabilizing Eurasia. It seems thus far that Washington will not risk losing its ability to work with Russia on a range of other issues. While this is ostensibly a rational position, to communicate this stance to Moscow at this juncture in the crisis will only encourage Putin to move forward with his neo-imperial project, raising the specter of a military confrontation down the line should Moscow move deeper into post-Soviet space, or even challenge one of the Baltic states.

Andrew A. Michta is the M.W. Buckman Professor of International Studies at Rhodes College and a senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).

http://www.the-american-interest.com/

 

France, Belgique, Canada, Suisse

Le Secteur du peuple, Lviv: Chers collègues!

La Russie a commis un acte dagression contre lUkraine et a annexé la Crimée. Depuis quelques semaines, la Russie met en place des groupes terroristes et des saboteurs dans les régions orientales de lUkraine. Son but perturber les élections présidentielles légitimes. Actuellement la vie des habitants dans ces regions situées en plein milieu de lEurope sest transformée en un cauchemar continuel. On est en train de détruire notre pays devant nos propres yeux. Par conséquent, nous prenons notre courage à deux mains pour continuer à vous tenir aux courant des événements en Ukraine. Cest un point de vue parmi dautres. Nous essayerons de rester objectifs.


Le 1 mai - Le Conseil dadministration du Fonds monétaire international (FMI) approuve un crédit  stand-by  de deux ans pour lUkraine dun montant de $17,01 milliards US.

Le 1 mai Un rassemblement anti-guerre en faveur de lUkraine se tient à Saint-Pétersbourg ; les militants ont chanté lhymne ukrainien et brandi des drapeaux ukrainiens. A Moscou sest tenue une manifestations pro-Poutine officielle en soutien aux actions pro-russes. Les policiers de lOMON (détachement spécial de la police) ont arrêté huit militants qui se trouvaient dans la rue Tverskaya avec le drapeau ukrainien.

Le
1 mai  Youriy Apoukhine, le leader de lassociation pro-russe  Velikaya Rouss  (la Grande Rouss), détenu par le SBU, ainsi que dautres extrémistes préparaient des attentats à la bombe le 9 mai pendant la fête de la Victoire.  déclaration du Service de sécurité ukrainien.

Le 1 mai A Donetsk, les séparatistes pro-russes prennent dassaut le Bureau du Procureur. Les séparatistes se cachaient derrière les civils et utilisaient des armes à feu contre la Garde nationale. Lors de lassaut du Bureau du procureur de la région de Donetsk, 26 personnes ont été blessées et deux sont hospitalisées .

Le 1 mai Le Président ukrainien par intérim, Oleksandr Tourtchynov signe un décret sur ​​la conscription dans les forces armées de lUkraine et dautres unités militaires ukrainiennes.

Le 1 mai - Le Président russe, Vladimir Poutine estime que le gouvernement ukrainien devrait retirer ses troupes des régions orientales du pays (où les séparatistes pro-russes sèment le chaos-éditeur). Poutine a fait cette déclaration au cours dune conversation téléphonique avec la Chancelière allemande, Angela Merkel.


P.S.: Faîtes circuler cet appel, SVP!

 

Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier

Ukraine: comment l'Occident peut reprendre la main face à Poutine

FIGAROVOX/TRIBUNE- Pour le chercheur Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier, la mise en place de nouvelles sanctions contre la Russie ne suffira pas. Pour reprendre l'initiative, les Occidentaux doivent réviser leurs représentations géopolitiques et soutenir l'Etat ukrainien

 

Les appels au dialogue et à la désescalade ne suffisant pas à arrêter le Kremlin, tout au démantèlement de la souveraineté ukrainienne, les Etats du G-7 et l'Union européenne ont décidé de nouvelles sanctions. Au vrai, les gouvernements occidentaux peinent à reprendre l'initiative. Représentations et enjeux politiques doivent être révisés et explicités.

L'option militaire d'emblée exclue, les Occidentaux ont privilégié les sanctions diplomatico-financières, non sans conséquences pour Moscou, et brandi la menace de mesures économiques ciblées. A rebours des groupes d'intérêts particuliers et de ceux qui exagèrent complaisamment les vulnérabilités européennes, un conflit géoéconomique d'ensemble menacerait principalement les intérêts russes.

Les exportations de produits énergétiques vers l'Europe assurent l'essentiel du commerce extérieur de la Russie, une large part de son PIB et plus encore des ressources fiscales. Déjà, les dépenses publiques peinent à financer les promesses électorales de Vladimir Poutine, le vaste programme de réarmement et le projet géopolitique russo-asiatique.

Certes, les contre-effets de nouvelles sanctions sur les économies européennes ne sont pas à négliger, d'autant plus que la Russie n'est pas une masse inerte ; le Kremlin prendra des mesures de rétorsion. Pourtant, la gravité de la menace légitime le franchissement d'un nouveau seuil.

Sous Poutine, la Russie s'est engagée dans une politique de révision des frontières, par les armes et la subversion. Elle remet en cause les fondements juridiques et moraux de l'ordre international européen. Ce révisionnisme géopolitique est complété par un réunionisme axé sur la satellisation des Etats successeurs de l'URSS.

L'idée-force du président russe est la revanche sur la Guerre froide et l'inversion du cours de l'Histoire. Dans ses représentations géopolitiques, l'Europe n'est qu'une petite péninsule accolée à la masse eurasiatique et les instances euro-atlantiques (UE et OTAN) sont condamnées à disparaître. Déchirée par des jeux d'alliances et de contre-alliances entre Etats-nations, l'Europe glisserait alors dans la sphère d'influence de la Russie-Eurasie.

Au préalable, il faut que Moscou contrôle l'Ukraine et comprime les Etats du voisinage. A cheval sur le centre et l'est de l'Europe, l'Ukraine recoupe donc des enjeux dépassant ses seules destinées. Une intervention militaire directe de la Russie est possible et le démembrement du territoire ukrainien, déjà amorcé avec la Crimée, aurait de graves conséquences. Rappelons que plus du quart des frontières de l'Europe, dans sa plus grande extension, a été tracé après le tournant de 1989-1991.

Lorsque l'ordre international est menacé, avec le risque de guerres en chaîne, la raison politique doit l'emporter sur la logique marchande. Dans les situations d'exception, il revient à l'instance souveraine de faire prévaloir le bien commun sur les multiples intérêts contradictoires qui faussent la perception et la hiérarchie des enjeux.

Pourtant, les sanctions ne suffiront pas et les représentations géopolitiques occidentales doivent être révisées.

Les partenariats développés dans l'après-Guerre froide avaient pour fondement l'idée selon laquelle la classe dirigeante russe rallierait l'Occident. Malgré la guerre russo-géorgienne d'août 2008, la Russie était encore perçue comme un partenaire qui voudrait améliorer les termes de l'échange avec les Occidentaux. L'Administration Obama a donc maintenu le cap et pratiqué la diplomatie du reset.

L'image de la Russie comme partenaire naturel de l'Occident est aujourd'hui dissipée. Son régime autoritaire-patrimonial n'est pas réductible à un simple système mafieux et cupide ; Poutine porte un projet géopolitique qui fait de l'Etat russe une puissance révisionniste et revancharde.

Confrontés à ce révisionnisme, les Occidentaux doivent dépasser le mécanisme action-réaction et reprendre l'initiative. Plutôt que d'invoquer un scénario de finlandisation invalidé par les faits, tout en se limitant à une riposte graduée en retard sur les événements, il faut soutenir fermement l'Ukraine.

Les pays du G-7, l'UE et le FMI ont rassemblé une aide financière conséquente, subordonnée à la mise en œuvre de réformes structurelles. Si l'on va au fond des choses, seules de telles réformes ouvriront un avenir économique à l'Ukraine et lui permettront d'atteindre les standards du voisin polonais.

Pourtant, l'économie n'est pas le destin et le futur commence ici et maintenant. Si l'Ukraine était démembrée, l'Europe médiane sombrant dans la peur du chaos, les programmes macro-économiques de longue portée ne seraient que flatus vocis, c'est-à-dire simples émissions de voix.

A la suite de longues années d'impéritie et de corruption, et de noyautage des forces de sécurité, l'appareil d'Etat ukrainien est littéralement épuisé et la perte de la Crimée a fragilisé le gouvernement provisoire. A l'évidence, Kiev peine à assumer le contrôle de l'Ukraine continentale et des frontières avec la Russie.

Il appartient donc à l'UE et à ses Etats membres de soutenir la reconstitution d'un appareil d'Etat à même d'exercer ses fonctions. Quant à l'OTAN, son rôle ne saurait se limiter à la seule défense des Alliés, sur leur limes oriental. Son partenariat spécifique avec l'Ukraine et le concept de sécurité coopérative sont des cadres d'action pour aider Kiev à mettre sur pied des forces de sécurité fiables et efficaces.

Enfin, le Politique ne se limite pas aux situations de détresse. L'aide apportée à l'Ukraine et la nouvelle approche occidentale de la Russie doivent s'inscrire dans une vision d'ensemble: un vaste Commonwealth paneuropéen fondé sur le droit, la justice et la liberté.

 

Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier est chercheur associé à l'Institut Thomas More.

 

 

 


Deutschland, Österreich, Schweiz

Bürgercenter von Maidan, Lemberg
Liebe Kolleginen, liebe Kollegen;

Russland hat einen Akt der Agression gegenüber der Ukraine begangen, indem es die Krim annektierte. Nun hat es terroristische Saboteurgruppen in die Ostukraine eingeschleust. Das Ziel ist, die legale Präsidentschaftswahlen in der Ukraine zu verhindern. Deswegen wird das Leben im Osten der Ukraine zum Albtraum inmitten von Europa gemacht. Vor unseren Augen wird das Land zerstört. Daher nehmen wir unser Mut zusammen, um Sie über die Ereignisse in der Ukraine zu informieren. Das ist nur ein Standpunkt, obwohl wir versuchen, objektiv zu sein.
1. Mai - Das Exekutivkomitee des Internationalen Währungsfonds (IWF) hat ein zweijähriges Standby-Abkommen mit der Ukraine in Höhe von 17,01 Mrd. USD bewilligt.
1. Mai - In Sankt-Petersburg fand eine Anti-Kriegsdemo zur Unterstützung der Ukraine statt. Aktivisten haben die ukrainische Hymne gesungen und ukrainische Flaggen gehalten. In Moskau fand dagegen eine offizielle Pro-Putin-Kundgebung statt, die die Handlungen pro-russischer Separatisten unterstützte. In Moskau haben Polizisten der Sondereinheit OMON acht Aktivisten festgenommen, die mit ukrainischer Fahne auf der Trewskaja Strasse gingen.
1. Mai - Der von der SBU (Sicherheitsdienst der Ukraine) festgenommene Anführer des pro-russischen Vereins "Großrussland" Juri Apuchtin habe mit anderen Extremisten Explosionen während öffentlicher Veranstaltungen zum Siegestag am 9. Mai vorbereitet, so der SBU.
1. Mai - In Donezk haben die Separatisten das Gebäude der Staatsanwaltschaft gestürmt. Separatisten haben gegen Mitglieder der Nationalgarde Schusswaffen eingesetzt, wobei sie die Zivilbevölkerung als Schutzschild nutzten. Bei der Erstürmung der Staatsanwaltschaft im Gebiet Donezk wurden am Donnerstag 26 Personen verletzt, zwei davon wurden in Krankenhäuser gebracht.
1. Mai - Der Übergangs-Präsident der Ukraine Oleksandr Turtschinow hat einen Erlass über die Wiedereinführung der Wehrdienstpflicht in der ukrainischen Armee sowie anderen Militärverbänden der Ukraine unterzeichnet.
1. Mai - Der russische Präsident Wladimir Putin ist der Meinung, dass die ukrainische Regierung ihre Truppen aus den "problematischen" Regionen im Osten des Landes, wo die pro-russischen Schlägertrupps ihr Unwesen treiben, abziehen soll. Das hat Putin in einem Telefongespräch mit der deutschen Kanzlerin Angela Merkel erklärt.


PS: Bitte, wie weit verbreitet diese Informationen wie möglich.





Građanski sektor Majdana, Lavov: Poštovane koleginice i kolege!

Rusija je izvršila akt agresije prema Ukrajini anektiravši Krim. Sada je uvela terorističko-diverzantske grupe u Istočnu Ukrajinu. Cilj je da se spreče legalni izbori predsednika. Zato je sad život u Istočnoj Ukrajini pretvoren u totalni užas u centru Evrope. Na naše oči uništava se naša zemlja. Zato se usuđujemo da vas informišemo o događajima u Ukrajini. Ovo je još jedna tačka gledišta. Trudićemo se da budemo objektivni.

1. maj. Izvršni savet Međunarodnog monetarnog fonda odobrio je za Ukrajinu dvogodišnji kreditni Ugovor stand-by u visini $17,01 milijardi.

1. maj. U Sankt-Petersburgu održao se antiratni miting podrške Ukrajini. Aktivisti su pevali himnu Ukrajine, demonstrirali sa zastavama Ukrajine. A u Moskvi se održao zvanični proputinski miting uz odobrovanje delovanja proruskih separatista. U Moskvi službenici OMON priveli su osam aktivista koji su išli ulicom Tverskom sa zastavom Ukrajine.

1. maj. Uhapšeni Službom bezbednosti Ukrajine lider proruskog udruženja Velika Rus Jurij Apuhtin zajedno sa drugim ekstremistima pripremao je eksplozije 9. maja za vreme masovnih manifestacija povodom Dana Pobede, − Služba bezbednosti Ukrajine.

1. maj. U Donjecku proruski separatisti osvojili su na juriš zgradu tužilaštva. Separatisti, prikrivajući se mirnim stanovništvom, upotrebljavali su protiv vojnika Nacionalne garde vatreno oružje. Za vreme juriša na tužilaštvo Donjecke oblasti u četvrtak povređeno je 26 osoba, dve osobe zadržane su u bolnici.

1. maj. V.d. Predsednika Ukrajine Oleksandr Turčinov potpisao je naredbu o pozivu za odsluženju vojnog roka u Oružanim snagama Ukrajine i drugim vojnim jedinicama Ukrajine.

1. maj. Predsednik Rusije Vladimir Putin smatra da ukrajinska vlada treba da povuče svoje trupe iz problematičnih regiona u istočnom delu zemlje gde čine bezakonje proruski separatisti. Putin je to izjavio za vreme telefonskog razgovora sa kancelarom Nemačke Angelom Merkel.


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Polska

Ludowy sektor Majdan, Lwów: Szanowni Państwo!

Rosja dokonała aktu agresji przeciw Ukrainie, anektując Krym. Teraz Rosja wprowadziła grupy terrorystyczno-dywersyjne na Wschodnią Ukrainę. Cel jej działań zapobiec legalnym wyborom prezydenckim na Ukrainie. Dlatego dziś życie mieszkańców Wschodniej Ukrainy pozostaje ciągłym horrendum w środku Europy. Na naszych oczach niszczą nasz kraj. Dlatego bierzemy na siebie odwagę informować państwa o wydarzeniach na Ukrainie. To jest jeszcze jeden punkt widzenia. My postaramy się być uczciwymi.

 

1 maja Rada Wykonawcza Międzynarodowego Funduszu Walutowego (MFW) zatwierdziła dwuletnią umowę kredytową stand-by dla Ukrainy w wysokości 17,01 miliardów dolarów.

1 maja w Sankt-Petersburgu odbył się antywojenny mityng na rzecz Ukrainy, rosyjscy aktywiści śpiewali hymn Ukrainy, wiecowały z flagami ukraińskimi. Jednocześnie w Moskwie odbył się oficjalny proputinowski mityng pierwszomajowy w zewnętrznej stylistyce z czasów ZSRR, który wsparł działania prorosyjskich terrorystów na terenie Ukrainy. W Moskwie oficerowie policji aresztowali ośmiu aktywistów, którzy szły po ulicy Twierskoj z flagą Ukrainy.

1 maja Zatrzymany przez SBU lider prorosyjskiego związku "Wielka Ruś" Jurij Apuchtin razem z innymi ekstremistami przygotowywał wybuchy w dniu 9 maja podczas imprez świątecznych z okazji Dnia Zwycięstwa. O tym poinformowała Służba Bezpieczeństwa Ukrainy.

1 maja W Doniecku prorosyjscy terroryści-separatyści zaatakowali budynek prokuratury. Kryjąc się za cywilami, napastnicy użyli przeciwko żołnierzy Gwardii Narodowej broni palnej. Pod czas zajęcia prokuratury obwodu Donieckiego w czwartek zostali ranne 26 osób, dwie osoby trafili do szpitalu.

1 maja P.o. Prezydenta Ukrainy Ołeksandr Turczynow podpisał dekret o poborze na służbę wojskową w Siłach Zbrojnych Ukrainy i innych formacjach wojskowych kraju.

1 maja Prezydent Federacji Rosyjskiej Władimir Putin uważa, że rząd ukraiński musi wycofać swoje wojska z objętych rozruchami regionów we wschodniej części kraju, gdzie czynią masowe przestępstwa terroryści-separatyści rosyjskie. O tym Putin powiedział w rozmowie telefonicznej z kanclerz Niemiec Angelą Merkel.

 


Postscriptum: Proszę rozprzestrzeniać tę informację jak najszerzej.



Italia, Svizzera, Vaticano

Settore pubblico di Maidan, L'viv: Gentili colleghi!

La Russia, annettendo la Crimea, ha effettuato un atto di aggressione nei confronti dell'Ucraina. Ora essa ha introdotto gruppi terroristici e sovversivi in Ucraina orientale. Il suo fine è quello di vietare che le elezioni presidenziali legittime abbiano luogo. In questo modo la vita in Ucraina orientale si è trasformata in un incubo nel cuore dell'Europa. Davanti ai nostri occhi viene distrutto il nostro Paese. Per questo, ci prendiamo la responsabilità di informarvi riguardo agli eventi in Ucraina. Si tratta di un altro punto di vista. Cercheremo di essere obiettivi. 

1 maggio - Il consiglio esecutivo del Fondo Monetario Internazionale (FMI) ha approvato un contratto di credito per l'Ucrain della durata di due anni per un totale di 17 miliardi di dollari. 

 

1 maggio - A San Pietroburgo si è tenuta una manifestazione contro la guerra e a sostegno dell'Ucraina; gli attivisti hanno cantato l'inno dell'Ucraina, esposto le bandiere ucraine. A Mosca si è tenuta una manifestazione ufficiale a sostegno di Putin e dei separatisti filorussi. A Mosca gli agenti di polizia hanno arrestato otto attivisti che stavano marciando lungo la via Tverskaya con la bandiera dell'Ucraina. 

 

1 maggio - Yuri Apukhtin, il leader della compagnia filorussa "Velikaya Rus'" arrestato dalla SBU (Servizio di Sicurezza dell'Ucraina), stava preparando insieme ad altri estremisti un attentato per il 9 maggio, in occasione delle manifestazioni per la festa del Giorno della Vittoria, - comunica la SBU. 

 

1 maggio - A Donets'k, i separatisti filorussi hanno preso d'assalto l'edificio della Procura. I separatisti, usando i civili come scudo, utilizzavano armi da fuoco contro i militari della Guardia nazionale. Nel corso della presa della Procura sono state ferite 26 persone, due delle quali sono state ricoverate in ospedale. 

 

1 maggio - Il Presidente dell'Ucraina ad interim Oleksandr Turchynov ha firmato un decreto riguardante la chiamata al servizio militare nelle Forze Armate dell'Ucraina e in altre formazioni militari ucraine.  

 

1 maggio - Il presidente russo Vladimir Putin ritiene che il governo ucraino debba ritirare le sue truppe dalle regioni in difficoltà nella parte orientale del Paese, dove stanno agendo i separatisti filorussi. Lo ha affermato Putin nel corso di una conversazione telefonica con il cancelliere tedesco Angela Merkel. 

 


Post scriptum: Si prega di diffondere queste informazioni il più ampiamente possibile.





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We exspress our sincere gratitude to the International Renaissance Foundation that supported this publication.

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