незалежний
культурологічний часопис <Ї> |
незалежний
культурологічний часопис <Ї> |
 www.ji-magazine.lviv.ua This is Ukraine
today. C'est l'Ukraine d'aujourd'hui. Dies ist die
Ukraine heute. To jest Ukraina
dzisiaj. Esta es la
actual Ucrania. Questo è l'Ucraina di oggi. Esta é hoje a Ucrânia. Ukrajina je danas. Это Украина сегодня. Це Україна сьогодні 01.05.2014
Дорогі друзі – сьогодні
найважливішою є підтримка світу – тому даруйте, що пишемо так коротко і
схематично – це інформація для людей, які мало що знають про Україну.
May
1 – The Executive Board of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a two-year Stand-By Arrangement for
Ukraine. The arrangement amounts to US$17.01 billion. May
1 – An antiwar rally in support of Ukraine was held in St.Petersburg. Activists
sang the anthem of Ukraine and walked along holding Ukrainian lags. An official
pro-Putin rally took place in Moscow, approving the actions of pro-Russian
separatists. Moscow riot police officers arrested eight activists who were
walking and holding Ukrainian flag at Tverskaya Street. May
1 – The leader of pro-Russian union “Velikaya Rus” Yuriy Apukhtin who was
detained with other extremists by Security Service of Ukraine (SSU), had
planned explosions for May 9 (during commemorative Victory Day events), states
SSU. May
1 – In Donetsk, the pro-Russian separatists seized the Prosecutor's Office
building. While hiding behind civilians, separatists used firearms against the
soldiers of National Guard of Ukraine. On Tuesday, during the attack on the
Prosecutor's Office 26 people were injured, two of them have been hospitalized. May
1 – Acting President of Ukraine Oleksandr Turchynov has signed a decree on
conscription for military service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other
military formations of Ukraine. May
1 – Russian President Vladimir Putin believes that the Ukrainian government
should withdraw its troops from the troubled regions in the eastern part of the
country where pro-Russian separatists are currently committing acts of
violence. Putin has said this during a telephone conversation with German
Chancellor Angela Merkel.
Andrew
A. Michta Crisis
in Ukraine Known Unknowns A
fog of uncertainty has descended on Ukraine and Eastern Europe, but there are
still a few things that we do know (as well as a few things that we know we
don’t know). The
crisis in Ukraine has been building up not for months, as media accounts have
it, but for years, especially if we recognize the original framing of Vladimir
Putin’s Munich 2007 “declaration of intent” to reverse the damage to Russia’s
power caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union.
So it is not premature to draw some preliminary conclusions as to how arguably
the greatest crisis along Europe’s periphery since the end of the Cold War has
shaped the Transatlantic security environment. Today Ukraine and all of Eastern
Europe are covered by a blanket of uncertainty. But we can nevertheless discern
the basic shapes of several “unknowns” beneath that blanket. There
is no question that the principal culprit in the unfolding crisis is Vladimir
Putin’s Russia, and specifically its neo-imperial project. A lot of ink, too,
has been spilled over Ukrainians’ complicity and culpability for what has
befallen them from the east. But we also need to ask ourselves what role the
strategic drought in Washington in relations with Europe has played in the
current predicament. In particular, the Obama Administration’s conviction that
Eastern Europe was a “done deal,” and that America needed to pivot
unequivocally toward the Pacific and leave the perennially self-focused
Europeans to take care of their own needs, has set the tone for Transatlantic
relations, especially at the military level. While America’s expectations that
Europe should spend more on defense are more than justified, those expectations
cannot be met if they are seen as merely transactional in nature and not part
of a larger strategic framework. Of
course, Europe is also guilty of the sins of omission and commission that
contributed to the drama unfolding on the continent’s periphery. For in its own
way the traditional inertia and indecision of the European Union has played a
key part. It is true that the “Eastern Partnership” led by Poland and Sweden
offered a smidgen of hope to the pro-Western forces in Eastern Europe that they
would not be left on the other side of the divide. But for the largest European
powers, on the other hand, especially Germany, these prospects always belonged
in the stratospheric layers of high theory. Add to this the EU bureaucracy’s
traditional penchant for keeping things open (i.e., indecision), which pumped
out conflicting messages to the region, contributing both to a sense of
opportunity and to unease in Moscow. In the end, when Ukrainians in Maidan
simply said “no” to their gangster government, the European Union’s efforts to
have its cake in Ukraine and eat it too came to bite us all. We
already know the obvious: Today Ukraine is the core geopolitical argument, not
only between Russia and the West but also within the Transatlantic alliance.
Its outcome will define how Russia relates to the West, especially to the
United States, in the coming decade, on multiple levels, from the most basic
economic relations to military competition. We can also glean today the general
outline of the strategic objectives in Eastern Europe for both Russia and the
West, with a clear indication of the mismatch between what the two sides are
trying to accomplish. Russian
propaganda notwithstanding, the European Union’s goal has never been to
actually bring Ukraine into the fold as a full-fledged EU member down the line,
and it is questionable whether it wanted to build a sustainable interim
framework for association—the subsequent declarations and agreements are
derivatives from the crisis, not initial strategic assumptions.
At the same time, today Russia cannot bring Ukraine immediately into the Eurasian
Union, for whatever imperial aspirations Vladimir Putin has, he understands the
complexity of that country’s ethnic makeup. Having exploited it better than
most, he cannot be under any illusions that Ukraine today would be ready to
make such a decision forthwith. The reality is different: Putin’s goal for now
is largely negative—that is, to ensure that Ukraine will never join either the
European Union or NATO, leaving the pathway for his integrative project open
for the future. Likewise, the United States and the European Union are more
interested in foreclosing Ukraine’s full integration in the Russia sphere of
influence than they are in peeling it away from Russia. Before the Maidan
explosion last year, a possible solution to this dilemma could have been de
facto or de jure neutrality for Ukraine, with the country still eventually
drifting into Russia’s orbit. However, events on the ground have outpaced
contingency planning. What’s more, such a resolution today is largely
impossible not because the West would ultimately reject it, but because the
Ukrainian public would veto it even more forcefully than Yanukovych’s initial
deal. Today
what divides the United States and Europe—or rather individual European
capitals, for a consensus is simply not there—are the ends-in-view of our
respective approaches: how much to give in to Moscow’s demands, and at what
price. The added variable is the constant of Russia’s expectations, growing
with each passing day, for since NATO has ruled out any military response, Ukraine
is Putin’s crisis to escalate or de-escalate at will. In statement after
statement, Moscow has made it abundantly clear that it will no longer accept a
non-aligned Ukraine. It has come to see the country as a buffer state, one
whose further partition seems all but inevitable. Russia demands the right not
only to hold on to parts of Ukraine’s territory, but also, more dangerously, to
determine the constitutional framework of its neighboring state. We
know already that Russia sees Ukraine as a landmark event, the beginning of its
return to superpower status in world politics. Still, the notion that Russia
has the power potential comparable to what is represented by the collective
West, or even China, seems more like wishful thinking. And yet Russia’s calculus
in its confrontation with the West, especially the United States, is largely
based on military indices of power, especially the strategic nuclear component
and Russia’s conventional military forces relative to the region. Time and
again Moscow has demonstrated its ability to equalize the power disparity
through its continued nuclear parity with the United States, coupled with the
sheer determination to act, including the willingness to use military
force—something the West has ruled out. Next,
the crisis in Ukraine should disabuse anyone still pining for the “reset” of
the notion that Moscow will accept the model of cooperation with the United
States proposed at the beginning of the Obama Administration, notwithstanding
Washington’s concessions at the time and since, including the scrapping of the
Bush-era missile defense program in Central Europe.
It is clear that the dominant narrative in Russia today about the historical
meaning of the fall of the Berlin Wall is very much like Germany’s Dolchstosslegende between
the two world wars. The conviction is especially pronounced among the Russian
military and intelligence services that the Soviet Union was never defeated but
simply surrendered without a shot under treacherous leadership. President
Putin’s $700 billion military modernization program for the next decade is
intended to restore the Russian military to its former greatness, in the
process putting to rest the image of Russia as the land of Gorbachev and
Yeltsin, caught in periodic “times of trouble” (smutnoye vremya). Another
known is that, notwithstanding the numerous columnists declaring that Ukraine
has forced the West to confront the reality of Russia’s revisionism, the crisis
has caused divisions within the West that are deeper today than at any point in
recent memory. Western reactions continue to run behind the
curve of Russia’s initiatives, whether on the ground in Ukraine or in various
multinational fora, most recently during the framing of the so-called “Geneva
compromise” which proved to be little more than a tactical move by Moscow to
test Western cohesion before accelerating its Spetsnaz campaign in
Donetsk. Thus far it appears that such tactics to
preserve the current state of disarray among Western allies have vindicated
Putin’s strategy of leveraging the United States’ determination to deescalate
the crisis, and EU leaders’ determination to preserve its economic ties with
Russia, ensuring that any Western-supported military response by Ukraine to
Russian aggression is off the table. We
also know that in the wake of the crisis, U.S. re-engagement in Europe is all
but inevitable, but there is no consensus yet as to its form and scope. The
Obama Administration’s Ukraine policy has been driven by an overarching desire
to minimize the costs of re-Europeanizing U.S. security policy priorities.
Although today in Washington only the most Pollyannaish would still believe
that a “pivot to” Asia could be predicated on an implicit “pivot away” from
Europe, budget realities remain what they have been, regardless of whether Mr.
Putin stays at home or marches on. If there is a bit of good news for the
collective West in the unfolding drama along Europe’s periphery, it is that,
whether one likes it or not, the United States is back in European security
affairs; the outstanding question is the depth of its renewed commitment. The
most important “known” is that Europe’s key power will not support direct
military assistance to Ukraine. Germany sent a clear message early in the
crisis that it would oppose any effort to “militarize” the conflict,
notwithstanding the fact that Ukraine has been the target of Russian military
operations. The ongoing Western discord on economic sanctions against Russia,
both within Europe and across the Atlantic, is proof positive that, several
months into the crisis, Putin can still count on having a disunited and
reluctant adversary. Here Germany remains the key variable; specifically,
Berlin’s unwillingness thus far to redefine its Ostpolitik and
abandon its allegedly modernizing engagement with Russia. In fairness, German
economic interests remain too deeply embedded there to allow rapid movement in
the opposite direction, and not just in the energy sector. Hence,
lobbying from the German business community against Russian sanctions and
statements from Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier warning of military
escalation and in opposition to NATO ground troops’ presence in Poland are but
the tip of the iceberg in a deepening clinch on Russia policy that has emerged
in the European Union in the wake of the crisis. To be fair, although
Germany remains the driver of EU foreign policy, similar sentiments prevail in
the business communities of other major powers in Western Europe, especially in
the United Kingdom, Italy, and, to a lesser extent, France. NATO
is another “known unknown” in this crisis. NATO is divided when it comes to its
relations with Russia in a different way than the European Union, for in
contrast to Western Europe, the north-central European and the Baltic members
will always prioritize their security over their considerable economic
interests in Russia. In practical terms this means that, unless the Obama
Administration can articulate a proactive strategy towards Russia and generate
sufficient support among West European allies around such a policy, it must
largely deal with Moscow through bilateral initiatives. Because
of the security imperative dominant along NATO’s northeastern flank, one aspect
of the Transatlantic relationship that is functioning effectively now is
America’s relationship with the states in the region, whose acute and justified
sense of danger has translated into a series of efforts to bring U.S. military
assets there. But even absent such a U.S.-led
strategy for Eurasia, actions by key European allies—in particular
Germany—have served as brakes on the pace of U.S. military deployments in the
region, especially since the Obama Administration has yet to show much
enthusiasm for such actions in the first place. Nonetheless, the United States
has stepped up to reassure the northeastern flank states, in stark comparison
to Western Europe’s inaction (save for four British Typhoons and four French
Rafale jets dispatched to Lithuania and Poland, respectively, for Baltic duty).
Although current U.S. deployments in Poland and the Baltics have been limited,
they are nonetheless absolutely critical—especially the ground forces—for
sending a message that the United States takes its Article V obligations
seriously. This
brings up a key “unknown unknown”: How will the United States ultimately define
its presence in north-central Europe? One response to the drift in Western
Europe would be for the United States to invest in those countries in NATO that
have shown themselves willing and able to work across the Atlantic and to
cooperate regionally to confront the rising Russian threat. Here Scandinavia,
the so-called Visegrad 4 led by Poland, the Baltics, and possibly Romania could
constitute the core foundation of such a reorientation. But a move to
regionalize NATO’s response, if it were to leave out Western Europe over time,
runs too high a risk of undercutting allied solidarity. Such an approach would
also inevitably run counter to intra-EU pressure, making economic linkages by
new NATO members to those of the “old core” all but impossible to overcome,
especially during continued budgetary austerity. Hence, Washington
should make its best effort to follow two tracks: expand U.S. military
deployments in Poland and the Baltics, and also lead all NATO members to
develop a strategy for the northeastern flank. For while it should work by
building consensus around the new strategy and leading by example, the United
States should also firmly demand that the time has come for the Transatlantic
alliance to speak with one voice on Russia. Russia’s challenge is to NATO as a
whole, and the alliance needs to respond collectively. But
we know that Europe’s paralysis means that, on the Western side, the crisis is
now firmly in the hands of the Obama Administration. It might (and in fact
let’s hope it does) grate on EU sensibilities that, yet again, it has only a
limited ability to shape its security environment so close to home. But even
so, there should be no illusions after the fiasco of the so-called “Geneva
deal,” that in the near term anything viable will be negotiated by John Kerry
and Sergei Lavrov—in part because that is how Russia wants it. The
key is this: We know today that the West will not militarily assist post-Soviet
countries outside NATO threatened by Russia’s neo-imperial ambition. It is also
clear that containment is the best option we can hope for, though in a number
of Western states large portions of the public believe that Ukraine is a
regional crisis and not part of Europe’s (and by extension America’s) vital
national interests. Some commentators in the United States and Europe have gone
so far as to claim that the West in effect has itself to blame for enlarging
NATO to the east, in the process breaking its alleged promises to Mikhail
Gorbachev. The fact that such arguments are even made—that is, that
post-communist Europe would have been better off as a macro-Ukraine of sorts or
a grey zone where a new Russian sphere of influence would be established by
default—says a lot about what passes for “realism” in some Western policy
debates. We
already know that a new fault line running along the borders of the Baltics and
the Bug River is now an undeniable reality, which, at least until Russia moves
again to expand its sphere of privileged interest farther, is a baseline that
will shape the NATO-Russia relationship. It therefore matters a great deal for the
future of NATO whether the alliance will devise a new strategy and build
contingency planning that can then be discussed and approved by the upcoming UK
summit. Every decision taken between now and September, especially the critical
ones concerning the deployment of U.S. and NATO troops in Poland and the Baltic
States, will impact the direction of the unfolding drama in Eastern Europe.
These decisions will also shape Russia’s choices going forward, potentially
deterring it from moving into Moldova, Georgia, or Kazakhstan. The
largest unknown is the lessons the Obama Administration will draw from this
confrontation. To put it differently, it is about the extent to which Russia
has linked and will continue to link other agenda items to its relationship with
the United States: Iran, Afghanistan, Syria, nuclear arms control are but the
most prominent among them. Thus far it seems after three months of spurious
negotiations that Washington is not going to prioritize Eastern Europe over
those agenda items, and that Putin’s linkage has held. The question is not
whether the United States will honor its treaty obligation. That message has
been unequivocal: It will. What is unknown at this point,
however, is whether the Administration will continue to operate on the narrowly
defined premise that its actions ought to be driven by its treaty obligations
to other NATO members alone, rather than those core commitments serving as a
baseline for a proactive strategy aimed at stabilizing Eurasia. It seems
thus far that Washington will not risk losing its ability to work with Russia
on a range of other issues. While this is ostensibly a
rational position, to communicate this stance to Moscow at this juncture in the
crisis will only encourage Putin to move forward with his neo-imperial project,
raising the specter of a military confrontation down the line should Moscow
move deeper into post-Soviet space, or even challenge one of the Baltic states. Andrew
A. Michta is the M.W. Buckman Professor of International Studies at Rhodes
College and a senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). http://www.the-american-interest.com/
France,
Belgique, Canada, Suisse
Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier Ukraine: comment l'Occident peut
reprendre la main face à Poutine FIGAROVOX/TRIBUNE- Pour le chercheur Jean-Sylvestre
Mongrenier, la mise en place de nouvelles sanctions contre la Russie ne suffira
pas. Pour reprendre l'initiative, les Occidentaux doivent réviser leurs
représentations géopolitiques et soutenir l'Etat ukrainien Les appels au «dialogue» et
à la «désescalade» ne suffisant pas à arrêter le
Kremlin, tout au démantèlement de la souveraineté
ukrainienne, les Etats du G-7 et l'Union européenne ont
décidé de nouvelles sanctions. Au vrai, les gouvernements occidentaux
peinent à reprendre l'initiative. Représentations et enjeux
politiques doivent être révisés et explicités. L'option militaire d'emblée exclue, les
Occidentaux ont privilégié les sanctions
diplomatico-financières, non sans conséquences pour Moscou, et
brandi la menace de mesures économiques ciblées. A rebours des
groupes d'intérêts particuliers et de ceux qui exagèrent
complaisamment les vulnérabilités européennes, un conflit
géoéconomique d'ensemble menacerait principalement les
intérêts russes. Les exportations de produits énergétiques
vers l'Europe assurent l'essentiel du commerce extérieur de la Russie,
une large part de son PIB et plus encore des ressources fiscales.
Déjà, les dépenses publiques peinent à financer les
promesses électorales de Vladimir Poutine, le
vaste programme de réarmement et le projet géopolitique russo-asiatique. Certes, les contre-effets de nouvelles sanctions sur les
économies européennes ne sont pas à négliger,
d'autant plus que la Russie n'est pas une masse inerte ;
le Kremlin prendra des mesures de rétorsion. Pourtant, la gravité
de la menace légitime le franchissement d'un nouveau seuil. Sous Poutine, la Russie s'est engagée dans une
politique de révision des frontières, par les armes et la
subversion. Elle remet en cause les fondements juridiques et moraux de l'ordre
international européen. Ce révisionnisme géopolitique est
complété par un «réunionisme» axé sur la
satellisation des Etats successeurs de l'URSS. L'idée-force du président
russe est la
revanche sur la Guerre froide et l'inversion du cours de l'Histoire. Dans
ses représentations géopolitiques, l'Europe n'est qu'une petite
péninsule accolée à la masse eurasiatique et les instances
euro-atlantiques (UE et OTAN) sont condamnées à
disparaître. Déchirée par des jeux d'alliances et de
contre-alliances entre Etats-nations, l'Europe glisserait alors dans la
sphère d'influence de la «Russie-Eurasie». Au préalable, il faut que Moscou contrôle
l'Ukraine et comprime les Etats du voisinage. A cheval sur le centre et l'est
de l'Europe, l'Ukraine recoupe donc des enjeux dépassant ses seules
destinées. Une intervention militaire directe de la Russie est possible
et le démembrement du territoire ukrainien, déjà
amorcé avec la Crimée, aurait de graves conséquences.
Rappelons que plus du quart des frontières de l'Europe, dans sa plus
grande extension, a été tracé après le tournant de
1989-1991. Lorsque l'ordre international est menacé, avec le
risque de guerres en chaîne, la raison politique doit l'emporter sur la
logique marchande. Dans les situations d'exception, il revient à
l'instance souveraine de faire prévaloir le bien commun sur les
multiples intérêts contradictoires qui faussent la perception et
la hiérarchie des enjeux. Pourtant, les sanctions ne suffiront pas et les
représentations géopolitiques occidentales doivent être
révisées. Les partenariats développés dans
l'après-Guerre froide avaient pour fondement l'idée selon
laquelle la classe dirigeante russe rallierait l'Occident. Malgré la
guerre russo-géorgienne d'août 2008, la Russie était encore
perçue comme un partenaire qui voudrait améliorer les termes de
l'échange avec les Occidentaux. L'Administration Obama a donc maintenu
le cap et pratiqué la diplomatie du «reset». L'image de la Russie comme partenaire naturel de
l'Occident est aujourd'hui dissipée. Son régime
autoritaire-patrimonial n'est pas réductible à un simple
système mafieux et cupide ; Poutine porte un
projet géopolitique qui fait de l'Etat russe une puissance révisionniste
et revancharde. Confrontés à ce révisionnisme, les
Occidentaux doivent dépasser le mécanisme action-réaction
et reprendre l'initiative. Plutôt que d'invoquer un scénario de
«finlandisation» invalidé par les faits, tout en se limitant à
une «riposte graduée» en retard sur les événements, il
faut soutenir fermement l'Ukraine. Les pays du G-7, l'UE et le FMI ont rassemblé une
aide financière conséquente, subordonnée à la mise
en œuvre de réformes structurelles. Si l'on va au fond des choses,
seules de telles réformes ouvriront un avenir économique à
l'Ukraine et lui permettront d'atteindre les standards du voisin polonais. Pourtant, l'économie n'est pas le destin et le
futur commence ici et maintenant. Si l'Ukraine était
démembrée, l'Europe médiane sombrant dans la peur du
chaos, les programmes macro-économiques de longue portée ne
seraient que flatus vocis, c'est-à-dire simples émissions de
voix. A la suite de longues années d'impéritie et
de corruption, et de noyautage des forces de sécurité, l'appareil
d'Etat ukrainien est littéralement épuisé et la perte de
la Crimée a fragilisé le gouvernement provisoire. A
l'évidence, Kiev peine à assumer le contrôle de l'Ukraine
continentale et des frontières avec la Russie. Il appartient donc à l'UE et à ses Etats
membres de soutenir la reconstitution d'un appareil d'Etat à même
d'exercer ses fonctions. Quant à l'OTAN, son rôle ne saurait se
limiter à la seule défense des Alliés, sur leur «limes»
oriental. Son partenariat spécifique avec l'Ukraine et le concept de
«sécurité coopérative» sont des cadres d'action pour aider
Kiev à mettre sur pied des forces de sécurité fiables et
efficaces. Enfin, le «Politique» ne se limite pas aux situations de
détresse. L'aide apportée à l'Ukraine et la nouvelle
approche occidentale de la Russie doivent s'inscrire dans une vision
d'ensemble: un vaste Commonwealth paneuropéen fondé sur le droit,
la justice et la liberté. Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier est chercheur
associé à l'Institut Thomas More.
Deutschland, Österreich, Schweiz
Сербіиа 1. maj. – Izvršni savet
Međunarodnog monetarnog fonda odobrio je za Ukrajinu dvogodišnji
kreditni Ugovor stand-by u visini $17,01 milijardi. 1. maj. – U Sankt-Petersburgu
održao se antiratni miting podrške Ukrajini. Aktivisti su pevali
himnu Ukrajine, demonstrirali sa zastavama Ukrajine. A u Moskvi se održao
zvanični proputinski miting uz odobrovanje delovanja proruskih
separatista. U Moskvi službenici OMON priveli su osam aktivista koji su
išli ulicom Tverskom sa zastavom Ukrajine. 1. maj. – Uhapšeni Službom bezbednosti Ukrajine lider
proruskog udruženja „Velika Rus“ Jurij Apuhtin zajedno sa drugim
ekstremistima pripremao je eksplozije 9. maja za vreme masovnih manifestacija
povodom Dana Pobede, − Služba bezbednosti Ukrajine. 1. maj. – U Donjecku proruski
separatisti osvojili su na juriš zgradu tužilaštva. Separatisti,
prikrivajući se mirnim stanovništvom, upotrebljavali su protiv
vojnika Nacionalne garde vatreno oružje. Za vreme juriša na
tužilaštvo Donjecke oblasti u četvrtak povređeno je 26
osoba, dve osobe zadržane su u bolnici. 1. maj. – V.d. Predsednika Ukrajine
Oleksandr Turčinov potpisao je naredbu o pozivu za odsluženju vojnog
roka u Oružanim snagama Ukrajine i drugim vojnim jedinicama Ukrajine. 1. maj. – Predsednik Rusije Vladimir
Putin smatra da ukrajinska vlada treba da povuče svoje trupe iz
problematičnih regiona u istočnom delu zemlje gde čine bezakonje
proruski separatisti. Putin je to izjavio za vreme telefonskog razgovora sa
kancelarom Nemačke Angelom Merkel.
Polska 1 maja – Rada Wykonawcza Międzynarodowego Funduszu
Walutowego (MFW) zatwierdziła dwuletnią umowę kredytową
stand-by dla Ukrainy w wysokości 17,01 miliardów dolarów. 1 maja – w Sankt-Petersburgu odbył się
antywojenny mityng na rzecz Ukrainy, rosyjscy aktywiści śpiewali hymn
Ukrainy, wiecowały z flagami ukraińskimi. Jednocześnie w Moskwie
odbył się oficjalny proputinowski mityng pierwszomajowy w
zewnętrznej stylistyce z czasów ZSRR, który wsparł
działania prorosyjskich terrorystów na terenie Ukrainy. W Moskwie
oficerowie policji aresztowali ośmiu aktywistów, którzy
szły po ulicy Twierskoj z flagą Ukrainy. 1 maja – Zatrzymany przez SBU lider prorosyjskiego
związku "Wielka Ruś" Jurij Apuchtin razem z innymi
ekstremistami przygotowywał wybuchy w dniu 9 maja podczas imprez
świątecznych z okazji Dnia Zwycięstwa. O tym poinformowała
Służba Bezpieczeństwa Ukrainy. 1 maja – W Doniecku prorosyjscy
terroryści-separatyści zaatakowali budynek prokuratury. Kryjąc
się za cywilami, napastnicy użyli przeciwko żołnierzy
Gwardii Narodowej broni palnej. Pod czas zajęcia prokuratury obwodu
Donieckiego w czwartek zostali ranne 26 osób, dwie osoby trafili do
szpitalu. 1 maja – P.o. Prezydenta Ukrainy Ołeksandr Turczynow
podpisał dekret o poborze na służbę wojskową w
Siłach Zbrojnych Ukrainy i innych formacjach wojskowych kraju. 1 maja – Prezydent Federacji Rosyjskiej Władimir
Putin uważa, że rząd ukraiński musi wycofać swoje
wojska z objętych rozruchami regionów we wschodniej
części kraju, gdzie czynią masowe przestępstwa
terroryści-separatyści rosyjskie. O tym Putin powiedział w
rozmowie telefonicznej z kanclerz Niemiec Angelą Merkel.
Italia, Svizzera, Vaticano 1 maggio - A San Pietroburgo si è tenuta una
manifestazione contro la guerra e a sostegno dell'Ucraina; gli attivisti hanno cantato l'inno dell'Ucraina, esposto le bandiere
ucraine. A Mosca si è tenuta una manifestazione
ufficiale a sostegno di Putin e dei separatisti filorussi. A Mosca gli
agenti di polizia hanno arrestato otto attivisti che
stavano marciando lungo la via Tverskaya con la bandiera dell'Ucraina. 1 maggio - Yuri Apukhtin, il leader della compagnia
filorussa "Velikaya Rus'" arrestato dalla SBU (Servizio di Sicurezza
dell'Ucraina), stava preparando insieme ad altri estremisti un attentato per il
9 maggio, in occasione delle manifestazioni per la festa del Giorno della
Vittoria, - comunica la SBU. 1 maggio - A Donets'k, i separatisti filorussi hanno preso d'assalto l'edificio della Procura. I
separatisti, usando i civili come scudo, utilizzavano armi da fuoco contro i
militari della Guardia nazionale. Nel corso della presa della Procura sono state ferite 26 persone, due
delle quali sono state ricoverate in ospedale. 1 maggio - Il Presidente dell'Ucraina ad interim
Oleksandr Turchynov ha firmato un decreto riguardante
la chiamata al servizio militare nelle Forze Armate dell'Ucraina e in altre
formazioni militari ucraine. 1 maggio - Il presidente
russo Vladimir Putin ritiene che il governo ucraino debba ritirare le sue
truppe dalle regioni in difficoltà nella parte orientale del Paese, dove
stanno agendo i separatisti filorussi. Lo ha affermato Putin nel corso di una
conversazione telefonica con il cancelliere tedesco
Angela Merkel.
Россия 1 мая - Исполнительный совет
Международного валютного фонда (МВФ) одобрил двухлетнее кредитное Соглашение
stand-by для Украины в размере $ 17,01 млрд. 1 мая - В Санкт-Петербурге состоялся
антивоенный митинг в поддержку Украины, активисты пели гимн Украины, шли с
флагами Украины. А в Москве прошел официальный пропутинский митинг с одобрением
действий пророссийских сепаратистов. В Москве сотрудники ОМОНа задержали
восьмерых активистов, которые шли по Тверской улице с флагом Украины. 1 мая - Задержанный СБУ лидер
пророссийского объединения "Великая Русь" Юрий Апухтин вместе с
другими экстремистами готовили взрывы на 9 мая во время массовых мероприятий по
случаю Дня Победы - Служба безопасности Украины. 1 мая - В Донецке пророссийские
сепаратисты взяли штурмом здание прокуратуры. Сепаратисты, прикрываясь мирным
населением, использовали против бойцов Нацгвардии огнестрельное оружие. Во
время штурма прокуратуры Донецкой области в четверг пострадали 26 человек, двое
- госпитализированы. 1 мая - И. о. Президента Украины
Александр Турчинов подписал указ о призыве на срочную военную службу в
Вооруженные Силы Украины и других военных формирований Украины. 1 мая - Президент России Владимир Путин
считает, что украинское правительство должно вывести свои войска из проблемных
регионов в восточной части страны, где бесчинствуют пророссийские сепаратисты.
Об этом Путин заявил во время телефонной беседы с канцлером Германии Ангелой
Меркель.
Україна 1 травня – Виконавча рада Міжнародного
валютного фонду (МВФ) схвалила дворічну кредитну Угоду stand-by для України в
розмірі $17,01 млрд. 1 травня – У Санкт-Петербурзі відбувся
антивоєнний мітинг на підтримку України, активісти
співали гімн України, демонстрували з прапорами України. А у Москві пройшов
офіційний пропутінський мітинг з схваленням дій проросійських сепаратистів. У
Москві співробітники ОМОНу затримали вісьмох активістів,
які йшли по Тверській вулиці з прапором України. 1 травня – Затриманий СБУ лідер
проросійського об’єднання "Великая Русь" Юрій Апухтін разом із іншими
екстремістами готували вибухи на 9 травня під час
масових заходів з нагоди Дня Перемоги - Службі безпеки України. 1 травня – У Донецьку проросійські сепаратисти
взяли штурмом будівлю прокуратури. Сепаратисти, прикриваючись мирним
населенням, використовували проти бійців Нацгвардії вогнепальну зброю. Під час штурму прокуратури Донецької області в четвер
постраждали 26 осіб, двоє - госпіталізовані. 1 травня – В. о. Президента України
Олександр Турчинов підписав указ про призов на
строкову військову службу до Збройних Сил України та інших військових формувань
України. 1 травня – Президент Росії Владимир
Путін вважає, що український уряд має вивести свої
війська з проблемних регіонів у східній частині країни, де безчинствують
проросійські сепаратисти. Про це Путін заявив під час
телефонної бесіди з канцлером Німеччини Ангелою Меркель.
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