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Lilia ShevtsovaUkraine How to Cross the Valley of TearsI suggest that everyone writing about Ukraine take an honest look at what
has been written and analyze
the accuracy of our predictions.
I think we will be forced
to admit that we often
failed to keep up with
the events in Ukraine and
thus drew erroneous conclusions. I will mention just
the most glaring misjudgments. Most analysts and
Western politicians believed that President
Viktor Yanukovych would sign the Association Agreement with the
EU; they did not believe that
he would dare to use
force; they underestimated Moscow’s potential to be
an active player on the
Ukrainian political field; they overrated
the influence of the Ukrainian
opposition and underrated the Maidan’s role; they were unprepared
for the rise
of the new
protest forces represented by the Right Sector
and the Maidan
self-defense formations; they exaggerate the passivity of
Ukraine’s southern and eastern regions;
they underestimated the Ukrainian people’s
readiness for self-sacrifice. None of us could
promptly identify the crisis of
a post-Soviet state and the collapse of
the model of governance that
exists in all of the
post-Soviet states (with an exception of
the Baltic countries). Finally, the
analysts misjudged the agreement between
Yanukovych and the opposition leaders brokered by the German
and Polish foreign ministers (with the input
from the French foreign minister and a Russian presidential envoy). The agreement
lasted less than a day, and
the absence of enforcement mechanisms is not
the reason for its failure.
Rather, the agreement did not
address the interests of the
protest segment of Ukrainian society,
which would not tolerate Yanukovych’s
presence on the political scene.
This deal was about a gradual
regime change, thus preserving the old-system interactions and elite clans and
enabling them to regroup in
the course of the year.
It is not
coincidental that the Kremlin is
defending this agreement with such passion. Perhaps,
Frank-Walter Steinmeier and
Radosław Sikorski, who forced the
deal, tried to take Moscow’s interests into account
and avoid irritating President Vladimir Putin. Perhaps, they feared
the growing strength of the
Maidan and the Right Sector,
trying to resolve the conflict
without the inclusion of the
new players. In any event,
the February 21 agreement bit the
dust the day after being
signed. Its only positive outcome
was involving Yanukovych in the
protracted negotiation process, which precluded him from
aggravating the situation even further. But the
agreement that ignored the sentiments
of the Ukrainian people and the
rising wave of protests in
the south and the east
definitely affected both the opposition
leaders’ and the western mediators’
reputation. I am not going to predict
how the Ukrainian
events are to unfold in
the future—it is impossible. Nevertheless, I believe it is
possible to discern a number of emerging trends,
which will remain relevant in the nearest
future. ·
Ukraine now
has new forces
that reflect the protest elements
in society; new leaders (including
those representing the Maidan and
the Right Sector) are emerging
and have already been publically
legitimated. There is a need for
a dialogue with these forces. In
fact, they enjoy greater credibility
than the established opposition, which is accused
of reflecting the interests of
oligarchic clans. The “maidanization” of the southeastern
regions also has to be
taken into account. It will
bring forth its own new
leaders. We have to keep
in mind that
the old clans
and the 2004 opposition attempted to take control
of the situation,
thus reproducing the clan system
of rule. ·
Ukrainian society
was able to invent a new
form of self-organization personified by the Maidan
protests across the country. The
Maidan will become a new political
institution that the new Ukrainian
regime and the West will
have to deal
with. ·
No matter which course the Ukrainian events take, overcoming
the crisis in Ukraine clearly
requires the formation of a new system. To
start the process, the presidential
and parliamentary elections must be held as
early as this spring. Some
urgently-needed amendments to
the Constitution can be passed
immediately, while the other changes
can be worked
on later. That is what
the Poles did during their
Velvet Revolution. But it should
be remembered that at this
point the question of Ukraine’s
“federalization” is being exploited by the supporters
of the old
regime. ·
The West needs to ponder
the following points: making good on the
promises made by the German
and Polish foreign ministers to return to
the issue of signing the
Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU and Ukraine’s prospective EU membership; discussing the Western guarantees
of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; the urgent aid
to the Ukrainian
government of national trust; the return of
assets stolen by the Ukrainian
leadership and kept in the
West to Ukraine,
as well as
the unacceptability of the trilateral
format of discussing the Ukrainian affairs. The Europe—Ukraine—Russia format,
which some in the West
(for instance, in Berlin) insisted
on, will just complicate Ukraine’s exit from its old
system and will be opposed
by the major
part of the
Ukrainian population. And perhaps, most importantly, the Ukrainians will have to deal
with a whole host of new
tactics employed by the Kremlin,
which remains the most influential
international player in Ukraine. The
Kremlin scenarios do not limit
themselves to the support for
Ukraine’s federalization and the Georgian
scenario. They also include Moscow’s
willingness to support any opposition
government (Putin dropped this hint
some time ago). Besides, Moscow hopes to
have a dialogue with Yulia Tymoshenko.
It is not
hard to understand
what the terms of such
a dialogue will be. Thus, the Ukrainian drama is far
from over, and the international
actors bear responsibility for its length and
excruciatingly painful results. As the
conflicts drags on, some of
them just sit on the
fence and talk, while others
lend their support to the
old regime. February 25th, 2014 |